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Notes
KENTUCKY'S JURISDICTIONAL BASES-
THE NEED FOR CHANGE
INTRODUCrION
Beginning with the early common law and extending through the
landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff' to the present, the law relating to
judicial jurisdiction over the person has undergone continuous change.
To gain a valid "in personam" judgment over a nonresident person or
corporation, Pennoyer held that due process required personal service
of process on the nonresident within the territorial limits of the forum.
However, rapid developments in corporate activities, communications,
and transportation soon created a demand to liberalize this stringent
rule. Thus, as has frequenttly occurred in legal history, the courts
resorted to the use of legal fictions in attempting to alleviate the prob-
lems created by these social and economic changes. Statutes were
enacted using theories of consent2 and later presences in order to
bring foreign corporations within the scope of the forum's jurisdiction.
Since such theories necessarily depended upon a determination that
the foreign corporation was "doing business," more recent statutes
were phrased in terms of the doing business standard.
Regarding individuals, the landmaik case of Hess v. Pawloski4 up-
held the constitutionality of a nonresident motorist statute, and a
later case established that a state could exercise jurisdiction over non-
residents engaging in activities which the state had traditionally sub-
jected to special regulation.6 These decisions were based upon the
195 U.S. 714 (1877).
2 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855). Consent may
be either actual or implied. Implied consent is based on the theory that a
corporation has no legal existence outside the state of incorporation. Since a state
can exclude a foreign corporation, it may also condition its entry: e.g., submission
to process and impliedly consenting to substituted service upon failure to appoint
a process agent. Although theoretically correct, such a theory appears unsound in
light of the practicalities of modem commercial life.
a Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
4274 U.S. 352 (1927).
5 Iu these statutes, a nonresident operator or owner, by his operation of the
vehicle within the state, is deemed to have made a designa'ed public official his
agent for service of process as to a cause of action arising out of operation of the
vehicle in the state. Although expressed in terms of 'implied consent," such
statutes are justified on the state's police power.
6 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935). Goodman in-
volved a dealer in corporate securities, an enterprise the state had traditionally
subjected to special regulation.
NotEs
state's interest in protecting its citizens from inherently dangerous
acts committed by nonresidents or acts in which the state has had a
"special" interest.1 Still another exception to the Pennoyer rule related
to jurisdiction over domiciliaries. 8 Finally, in 1945, the Supreme
Court, in International Shoe v. State of Washington," formulated the
due process test of "minimum contacts" for obtaining jurisdiction over
nonresidents not personally served within the state.
This evolutionary process culminating in the ambiguous "minimum
contacts" standard has resulted in different decisions on similar fact
patterns as well as different interpretations of similar legislative
terminology.10 Comprehensive legislation outlining more clearly the
extent to which a state should expand or restrict jurisdictional bases
could be an invaluable tool in alleviating this judicial uncertainty and
misunderstanding. Moreover, considering that Kentucky's most recent
legislative action in this area occurred at a time nearly coincidental 1
with the decision in International Shoe, the time is ripe for the Ken-
tucky Legislature and Court to re-examine and re-define its bases of
jurisdiction relating to nonresident individuals and corporations. The
necessity of revision will be demonstrated by analyzing existing
legislation in Kentucky and other states, court interpretations of this
legislation, and prevailing legal theories and constitutional standards.
LIcsLA=TRIE BEFoBm
Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render "in personam"
judgments was based on a theory of power over the defendant's
person, i.e., presence within the state's territorial limits. 12 Thus, the
7 Considering the numerous activities presently encompassed within the
state's police power, these decisions do not seem to impose significant limitations
on "in personam" jurisdicton over non-resident individuals. Further, any dis-
tinction between non-resident individuals and corporations for jurisdictional
purposes is unsound. See notes 26-8 infra and accompanying text.
s Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
9 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10 Compare Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 MI.
App. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), with Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre
Mills. Inc., 289 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956), and Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F.Sup.416 (D. Minn. 1959).
"1The International Shoe decision was announced in 1945 and Ky. RE~v.STAT. § 271.610(2) [hereinafter cited as KRS] became effective in 1946.
12 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts
over Foreigners, 26 HAnv. L. REv. 283, 284; Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts
Over Non-Residents in Our Federal System, 43 CoREa.I L.Q. 196, 198;
Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 Hanv. L. REv. 909. A
distinction should be drawn between the basis of the Pennoyer decision and the
basis of jurisdiction at common law. Pennoyer was decided under the due process
clause and merely adopted the traditional base of jurisdiction at common law,
i.e., physical power, as the constitutional standard. Contra, Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Con-
veniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
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generally recognized bases of "in personam" jurisdiction known to the
common law were presence, consent, appearance, and incorporation.
More recently developed bases, e.g., transacting business, committing
an act, are in derogation of the common law, and a court must have
express statutory authority before relying on them.'8 Clearly, personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents not physically within the state is such
an unusual exception to our normally restricted concepts of state
jurisdiction as to require legislative approval. Moreover, manifest in-
justice would result were a defendant unable to ascertain beforehand
whether his activities might be considered grounds by the state for
exercising judicial jurisdiction over him.14 Having recognized the
necessity of a statute to enable state courts to take advantage of these
newly developed bases of jurisdiction, the next step will naturally
require a determination by the Kentucky Legislature to depart from
the present legislative framework and incorporate these new bases
into its statutory law.15
Existing legislation in Kentucky, phrased in accord with the
traditional "doing business" standard,16 contains two limitations which
render the statute inadequate. First, the "doing business" standard, in
13 For a state to assume jurisdiction over nonresidents on bases not
recognized at common law, a statute is presumably mandatory. RESTATEmENT
(SECOND) OF TIE CONFLrCT OF LAws § 84, comment e (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1956); RESTATEIMEN OF JUDGMENTs § 23 (1942). The suggestion has been made
that if common law principles of jurisdiction are reasonably expanded, no statute
is needed. Moreland, Conflct of Laws-A Rationale of Jurisdlctio, 55 Ky. L.J. 11,
20 (1966). Even assuming a statute unnecessary to make use of such bases, a
statute is nevertheless necessary from a practical standpoint, i.e., to clarify this
area of the law, to express legislative policy, and to encourage state courts to
exercise jurisdiction. Moreover, legislatures and various other authorities have
obviously assumed the necessity o a statute in employing bases not existing at
common law, and legislatures have universally enacted legislation when departing
from the common law bases. Thus, the jurisdiction of state courts is controlled by
the state legislatures acting within the framework of state and federal consti-
tutions.
14 RnESTATFrEMNT (SECOND) OF THE CoNFracT OF LAW § 84, comment e
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
15 Enactment of legislation to extend the state's jurisdiction over nonresidents
to the constitutional limits is not mandatory on the legislature, but discretionary,
under the due process clause. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437, 440 (1952); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533,
535 (1922). The distinction between jurisdiction and extra-territorial recognition
of a judgment should be kept in mind. Although not required to expand itsjurisdictional bases, a state may be required to recognize a judgment from another
forum under the full faith and credit clause.
16KRS § 271.610(2) provides:
Any foreign corporation that does business in this state without having
complied with the provisions of KRS 271.385 as to designation of process
agent shall by doing such business, be deemed to have made the
Secretary of State its agent for the service of process in any civil action
instituted in the courts of this state against such corporation involving
a cause of action arising out of or connected with the doing of busi-
ness by such corporation in this state.
[Vol. 56,
restricting the statutes use to situations requiring a factual determina-
tion of doing business, fails to take full advantage of the consti-
tutionally permissible "minimum contacts" standard. Traditionally,
doing business has been interpreted to mean the transaction of a sub-
stantial amount of business within a state, its operation being con-
tinuous as distinguished from casual or occasional.1 7 Thus, a statute
phrased in these terms imposes a quantitative test in determining
when a nonresident not served within the state is amenable to process.
Obviously, this does not conform to the qualitative test of Inter-
national Shoe, since under this test certain isolated acts or transactions
"because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their
commission"' s can be sufficient to subject the nonresident to the
state's jurisdiction. Since continuous and systematic activities which
give rise to the liabilities sued on must be present, Kentucky's
statute encompasses only the inner limits of due process under Inter-
national Shoe.'9 A random sampling of the cases decided in other
states reveals many instances allowing the exercise of jurisdiction
over nonresidents under modem "long-arm" statutes which would
have been disallowed under traditional "doing business" statutes.2 0
17 The general consensus has been that isolated acts or transactions do not
constitute doing business. However, even though a nonresident is not doing
business, it is reasonable to exercise jurisdiction where the activity is conducted
for profit and has consequences within the state, although the acts are isolated or
occasional.
18 International Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310. 318 (1945).
'9 Id. at 317.2 0 In Liquid Carriers Corp. v. American Marine Corp., 375 F.2d 951 (2d
Cir. 1967), jurisdiction was upheld although the defendant had no employees,
agents, office, or telephone listing in New York. An executive officer of the
defendant had visited New York and conducted substantial preliminary negotia-
tions. The contract was to be performed exclusively in Louisiana. The court held
that the defendant's solicitation did not constitute doing business, but did con-
stitute a transaction of business.
Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967), held a New
York publisher subject to service of process under the tortious conduct provision
of Connecticut's long-arm statute in a libel prosecution. The court reasoned that
our minds must be freed from the traditional thinking that the plaintiff must
inevitably seek out the defendant.
In National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 34 I1. App. 2d
164, 214 N.E.2d 755 (1966), "in personam" jurisdiction was upheld although
National maintained no office or other place of business within the state and had
no agent or other representative to solicit, deliver, service, or accept payments
within the state. Except for the catalogues (supplemented by occasional flyers)
sent twice yearly to customers throughout the United States, Bellas Hess carried
on no advertising in Illinois. The orders filled in Missouri were sent to Illinois by
mail or common carrier. The case was reversed by the Supreme Court on the
ground that the commerce clause prohibits a state from imposing the duty of use
tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection in the state is by
common carrier or by mail. The issue of "in personam" jurisdiction was not
argued before the Court. The appellant noted that if the contacts were sufficient to
support jurisdiction to impose the substantive tax liabilities, they would probably
be held adequate for an enforcement action in the Illinois courts. The burden of
(Continued on next page)
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Likewise, research discloses no Kentucky case which has granted
jurisdiction on facts which could not be regarded as doing business
under traditional standards. In interpreting doing business, a Ken-
tucky federal district court stated: "ETihe fundamental principle of
the 'doing business' concept is the maintenar.ce within the jurisdiction
of a regular course of business activities."-" A similar line of reasoning
is expressed by the Sixth Circuit in a case which originated in Ken-
tucky: "The words 'doing business' are not technical. They are
ordinary words to be construed according to their ordinary meaning." 2
Although research produces but a few Kentucky cases of recent origin
interpreting "doing business," these cases reveal a reluctance, whether
it be by the Kentucky Court or a federal court interpreting Kentucky
law, to depart from the traditional language of doing business and
corporate presence. This type of statute, especially as traditionally
interpreted, is clearly the antithesis of the present trend in juris-
dictional concepts and a definite limitation on the jurisdictional power
of Kentucky courts.
A second deficiency of the doing business statute lies in the fact
that it applies only to foreign corporations 2 3 Without a long-arm
statute or other similar legislation, there is necessarily a gap in a
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
making a defense in a foreign jurisdiction was recognized to be less onerous
than the burden of acting as an extraterritorial tax collector. Brief for Appellant
at 12 n.2, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753(1967).
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. App. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), upheld jurisdiction where a foreign corporation had
negligently constructed a safety valve which it sold to the defendant who in-
corporated it into a heater subsequently shipped into the forum. The heater
exploded causing injury, and this was held to be tortious activity within the forum.
In Van Wagenbery v. Van Wagenbery, 241 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812(1966), jurisdiction was upheld over a Mary and husband who had executed a
separation agreement in New York under the "transacts any business" section of
the New York long-arm statute.
Rosenfeld v. Hotel Corp. of America, 20 N.Y.2d 25, 228 N. E. 2d 374 (197),
allowed jurisdiction over nonresident executors substituted for a properly served
defendant even though they had neither acted nor transacted business in New
York.
21 Brandeis Mach. & Supply Co., Inc. v. Matewan Alma Fuel Corp., 147 F.
Supp. 821, 823 (E.D. Ky. 1957).2 2 WSAZ, Inc. v. Gearhart, 254 F.2d 242, 246 (6th Cir. 1958).2 3 Besides the two limitations discussed, additional problems can be posed to
illustrate the inadequacy of present legislation. For example, nationwide disriution
of products has created the likelihood that injured persons will ieside in distant
forums; thus the need for extra-territorial service is increased. Also, there are
cases where courts are unable to reach parties whose presence is necessary to dojustice. When these parties are regarded as "indispensable," the court may be
unable to proceed with the cause of action at all. See, e.g., Hanson v. Dencda,
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
[Vol. 56,
state's claim to personal jurisdiction over nonresident individuals,24
partnerships, and unincorporated associations. 5 For jurisdictional
purposes, nonresident individuals and corporations should be treated
alike, although some states in enacting modem long-arm statutes
have limited their use to foreign corporations. Whatever differences
there are between corporations and individuals, they do not justify the
present differentiation in jurisdictional statutes. Although the de-
fendant in International Shoe was a corporation, the broad statements
made by the Court seem to apply to individuals as well. In McGee v.
International Life Insurance Company,26 the Court specifically spoke
of a trend toward expanding jurisdiction over foreign corporations
and other nonresidents. An individual, whether acting alone or through
agents, as well as a corporation, may have the contacts with the forum
necessary to subject him to its jurisdiction.
The privileges and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution
has long been a basis of distinguishing between the individual and the
corporation. A corporation is not a citizen; therefore it is not entitled
to the protection of the privileges and immunities clause.27 Thus, since
a state could exclude a corporation from entry into the state, condi-
tions may be imposed upon such entry. With this basis, the old "im-
plied consent" theory developed as a rationalization for allowing a
state to acquire jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Although still
urged by some as a means of separating the individual and corpora-
tion for jurisdictional purposes, the privileges and immunities argu-
ment is unsound for several reasons. First, even though nonresidents
are protected by the privileges and immunities clause, a state may
validly make certain demands on individuals, resident or nonresident,
under the police power. The broad powers given a state by the police
power would seem to include the state's interest in providing a forum
for adjudication of claims involving its citizens and nonresidents.
Moreover, the voluminous amount of interstate commercial trans-
24 KRS §§ 188.020-.030 (1962) provides for obtaining jurisdiction over non-
resident motorists. Also, Ky. R. Civ. P. 4 relating to constructive service and
warning order attorney would seem to fill this gap. However, when read in con-junction with KRS § 454.165 (1962), the scope of the Rule is significantly de-
creased. The statute provides that no personal judgment can be rendered against
a defendant constructively summoned and who has not appeared in the action.
KRS § 447.151 (1962) states that the Rules are not intended to abridge or
modify the substantive rights of any litigant.2 ; KRS § 446.010(7) provides that the word "corporation" may be applied
to any corporation, company, partnership, joint stock company, or association.
Therefore, these organizations might be brought under the doing business statute.26 355 U.S. 220 (1957).2 7 However, a state cannot prevent a foreign corporation from carrying on
interstate business.
1968] NoTs
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actions carried on daily makes any distinction based on a theory of
permissible exclusion of foreign corporations unrealistic. Lastly, reason-
ably construed, the privileges and immunities clause guarantees to
residents of foreign states the rights enjoyed by residents of the
forum.28 Residents have no right to commit a wrong within the forum
and escape the court's jurisdiction. If a resident is unable to do this, it
seems only reasonable to compel a nonresident who may have com-
mitted a similar wrong to also submit to the court's jurisdiction.
Having concluded that existing legislation needs revision, many
policy factors, as well as constitutional limitations (to be discussed
in a later section), must be considered in the actual drafting of a
statute.29 Legislatures inevitably encounter the paradox of attempting
to draft a statute covering all the situations in which a state's residents
have an interest while at the same time remaining within the limits
of due process. Obviously, it is difficult to draft a statute which reaches
these limits and yet does not violate due process in a given situation
if literally applied. Restrictive legislation, on the other hand, may well
exclude cases which should be tried within the forum. Therefore, the
statute should be phrased in general policy terms granting the courts
discretion to determine its applicability in close cases. However, the
legislature should make clear the general types of activities which are
to confer jurisdiction under the statute.
The primary purpose of a long-arm statute is to expand a state's
jurisdiction over nonresidents in conformity with the due process
standards of Internationa Shoe. Motivated by the state's desire to pro-
tect its citizens, an important policy factor for any legislature to
consider is its duty to provide its residents with an effective means of
enforcing their claims. The wide distribution of products in interstate
commerce and changes in products liability law have greatly increased
the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents. Without a statute granting
broad jurisdictional bases, the difficuties to individuals bringing
actions far from home would result in many just claims going un-
satisfied and wrongdoers escaping liability. The situation can easily
be imagined of a Kentucky resident being forced to defend on a
contract in the neighboring state of Tennessee which has a long-arm
28 See Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (19.35).
29 The policy factors involved are, of course, too numerous for elaboration.
Among the more important ones are the need to avoid overloading a state'sjudicial system, specific interest of the state in various activities, multiple liti-
gation, public necessity of extra-territorial service, and to insure the consti-
tutionality of statutes by declining to assert power to include every opportunity
for acquiring jurisdiction.
[Vol. 56,
Noms
statute, but unable to demand a reciprocal right under Kentucky law
if he so desired.
A second factor to consider in drafting a jurisdictional statute is
the state's desire to attract, or at least, not discourage commerce. For
those nonresidents who do not engage in substantial activities within
the forum, a broad jurisdictional statute could conceivably limit the
scope of commercial operations within the forum. In other words, non-
residents might feel that the benefits derived from only insubstantial
activities within the forum would not equal the possible costs of de-
fending a lawsuit there. As a corollary to this belief, critics have as-
serted that nonresidents would also refuse to deal with residents
without the forum due to fear of foreign suit. Although possible sub-
jection to litigation in a foreign state might discourage some com-
merce, such a consideration is probably of little, if any, significance
in the ordinary commercial transaction. In addition, this factor will be
even less significant as additional states are added to the already
long list of jurisdictions which have adopted "long-arm" statutes.
Although expanding jurisdictional bases will have a negligible
affect on the extent of commercial transactions within a given forum,
the possibility of unfair exercise of jurisdiction in some cases requires
further examination. In terms of fairness, when a nonresident engages
in a business transaction within the forum or in a transaction which
results in consequences within the forum, the state should have
jurisdiction as to a cause of action arising out of such transaction only
if the consequences were reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.
For instance, when a nonresident appeals to a national audience and
places products in the stream of commerce, the consequences can be
reasonably foreseen. Likewise, when catering solely to a local market,
the nonresident should be amenable to claims by those whose business
he solicits. This, of course, could include several states or perhaps one
metropolitan area covering sections of two or more states.30 On the
other hand, fairness dictates that the local merchant not be subject
to suit in a distant forum on a claim arising out of a sale to a transient
visitor. To illustrate, suppose a California resident purchases a pro-
duct of a national manufacturer from a small merchant while on a
trip to New York. The manufacturer whose advertising prompted the
sale should be amenable to process in California, but the New York
merchant should not. However, the same New York merchant reason-
ably could be subjected to a suit in New Jersey brought by a New
30 Cf. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(f), relating to service within one hundred miles
of the place where the action is commenced.
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Jersey resident from whom the local merchant regularly solicits
business.31 This approach is consistent with the realities of modem
commercial life. In most instances, the large company who caters to
the national market will have sufficient assets to litigate in more dis-
tant forums. The smaller company, however, will usually accommodate
a more limited market and have fewer assets. Thus, it is reasonable
not to compel the smaller firm to litigate in a distant forum. There-
fore, in enacting the appropriate legislation, a state should expressly
provide for jurisdiction over nonresidents who solicited business from
residents of the forum and were able to foresee the consequences
there.32
A third factor to be considered in drafting a statute is the parti-
cular legislative terminology to be employed. In response to present
constitutional guidelines, other states have attempted to take ad-
vantage of these newly developed bases by resorting to the use of
various vague directives. Examples of these include the following:
"transacts any business within the state"; 3 "commits a tortious act
within the state";34 "having an interest in, using, or possessing a real
right or immovable property in this state";35 "entering into a contract
for services to be performed or for materials to be firnished in the
state";36 and entering into any contract covering a risk located within
the state.37 With the exception of a few peculiarities, the language
used and the bases of jurisdiction thereby established have been re-
markably similar. The two most significant of the newly created bases
are those which subject a nonresident to the court's jurisdiction where
he transacts any business or where he commits tortious activity within
31 This approach should relieve the anxiety expressed in Erlanger Mills, Inc.
v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 501 at 507 (5th Cir. 1956), concerning
the reluctance of a local businessman to make an isolated sale to a nonresident
from a distant forum.
32 Clearly, there is great disparity economically between the consumer and
the manufacturer or large corporation. Since the manufacturer's purposes are being
fulfilled whenever the product is sold, defending claims could well be considered a
cost of doing business. Conversely, the smaller concern which appealed to a
localized market would not be subject to the jurisdiction of a court outside the
area of its local market. In a face dealing between the buyer and seller in the
seller's state, fairness may dictate that the buyer return to the state where he
did business to prosecute his claim. However, it is likeise fair to allow the
buyer to sue in his own state even though the product causing injury was
purchased in the seller's state where the seller has received benefits in the
uyer's state as a result of advertising and solicitation.
sN.Y. CoNsoL. LAws AN. § 302 (a) (1) (McKinney 1963).34 ILL. STAT. ANN. 110 § 17(b) (1956), as amended, (Supp. 1966).
35 LA. REv. STAT. AN. § 13.3201 (Supp. 1966).36TENN. CoDE ANN. § 20-235(e) (Supp. 1966).
37Id. at § 20-235(d).
[Vol. 56,
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the state. The conflict in the majority of the cases revolves around
interpretation of these two phrases.
Even under a plain meaning interpretation, "transacts any business"
denotes more isolated transactions than its ancestor "doing business,"
but it has still been construed to require activity by the defendant
within the state.38 The main controversy in construction of the
phrase "commits tortious activity" has been whether the statute is
satisfied where the only tortious act occurring within the state is the
injury.39 Restrained by the remnants of Pennoyer, the courts in inter-
preting these statutes are still searching for physical presence or
physical activity within the forum by the nonresidents to sustain
jurisdiction.
The above examples clearly illustrate the difficulty involved in
using broad, ambiguous phrases. Although such phrases achieve the
desired breadth of coverage, the ambiguities they contain have
prompted considerable litigation. Comprehensive legislation could
alleviate some of these problems. For example, the legislation could
provide that "commits tortious activity" is to be construed to include
those situations where a product of a national manufacturer has been
sent into the state, causing injury. These legislative illustrations should
attempt to cover the more controversial situations, but in no sense
should they be exhaustive. Thus, some difficult interpretation prob-
lems would be anticipated, but the court would retain the flexibility
essential to workable solutions of unusual future fact situations.
A fourth factor worthy of consideration by drafters of jurisdiction
legislation is the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. This
doctrine is applied when a court, although having jurisdiction, con-
ceives itself a seriously inconvenient forum and thus refuses to
exercise its jurisdiction. The reasons for refusing jurisdiction must be
substantial and an alternative forum must be available before this
theory can be invoked. 40 Forum non conveniens is a necessary
corollary in obtaining maximum effectiveness of the "long-arm"
statute since certain factual situations may fall within the statutes
language, but an exercise of jurisdiction would create unfairness or
38 For a recent decision illustrating the significance between the two phrases,
see Liquid Carriers Corp. v. American Marine Corp., 375 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.
1967).
-9 In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 M1l. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), the Illinois court upheld jurisdiction where only the in-jury occurred within the forum. The court emphasized that in conflict of law the
rule was that the place of a wrong is where the last event takes place which is
necessary to render the actor liable. Several other decisions, however, have denied
jurisdiction where the only contact with the forum was the injury.40 Carter v. Netherton, 302 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1957).
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violate due process. Although available to courts aside from statute, a
statutory enactment of the doctrine accompanied by the factors to be
considered in its use could prove invaluable.41
Lastly, an examination of jurisdiction over nonresidents generally
in light of an over-all approach to jurisdictional problems must be
made. Under the "transient rule," where a court has acquired juris-
diction over a nonresident by service of process within the territory,
judgment may be entered as to any transitory action, i.e., an action
solely binding upon the person. Whether the transient rule developed
as a natural consequence of the "physical power" concept of juris-
diction is not relevant here.4 What is relevant is that the minimum
contacts standard, although previously applied only in those situa-
tions where service of process was not made within the forum,3
should be applicable whether the nonresident is served within or
without the forum.
Personal service alone should not be a sufficient contact to sustain
jurisdiction, although at some point presence necessarily becomes
sufficient. The due process standard of minimum contacts is based on
fairness, and therefore it should preclude exercise of jurisdiction over
one temporarily within the forum's borders with whom the forum has
no other contact and involving a controversy in which the forum has
no interest. Moreover, the transient rule can unnecessarily create
conflict of law problems. Although the power of a court to render a
judgment and whether the law of a state can be applied have been
regarded as two separate problems, merger of the two is certainly
rational under modem concepts of jurisdiction based on a theory of
fairness. Abolishing transient jurisdiction would be a significant step
towards such a merger.44 Of course, courts may be reluctant to forego
jurisdiction over transients in certain situations. Thus, although similar
difficulty may be encountered in the legislature, the most effective
means of accomplishing this reform is through legislation.
4l This doctrine has recently been incorporated into the statutory law of
Wisconsin. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.19 (Supp. 1967). The statute gives the court
discretion upon motion to stay further proceedings upon a finding that the case
should as a matter of substantial justice be tried in another forum. The court is
to consider the amenability to personal service in the state and in the alternative
forum of the parties, convenience to the parties and witnesses, differences in con-
flict of law principles, and any other factor having a substantial bearing upon
the selection of a fair place for a trial.
42 The assertion has been made that the transient rule lacks precedent in the
English tradition of the common law as to both of its alleged sources-the physical
power doctrine and the venue concept of the transitory action. Rather, the
transient rule- is said to be explainable as a relic of Pennoyer which declared
service within the forum required. Ehrenzweig, supra note 12.
43 International Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 at 316 (1945).
44 One imminent authority has urged abolishment of the transient rule in a
number of articles. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 12.
[Vol. 56,
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CONITIlONAL LUrTATIoNS
Modern jurisdictional statutes greatly increase the power of state
courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents; thus, it is important
to determine if the exercise of jurisdiction authorized by such a
statute is constitutional. The impetus of the attack upon the consti-
tutionality of these statutes is founded in the tenets of the due process
clause.45
Assuming the case is brought to trial in a competent court" and in
accord with any other applicable state law,47 a valid personal judgment
can be obtained by satisfying two due process requirements. 48 These
are: (1) the defendant has been afforded an opportunity to be heard, 49
and a means of notice reasonably calculated to inform the defendant
has been used;r0 (2) the state has jurisdiction to subject the parties
and subject matter to its control. We are concerned here only with one
aspect of the second requirement, i.e., judicial jurisdiction over the
person.
Determining whether a jurisdictional statute can be constitutionally
applied to a particular defendant under the due process clause is a
twofold problem. The first aspect of the due process argument in-
volves a determination of the statute's constitutionality on its face,
e.g., is it void for vagueness or overly broad. No court has struck
down a "long-arm" statute on this basis thus far. On the contrary,
analysis of the relevant Supreme Court decisions as well as the ap-
proval of these statutes by many state courts and legislatures in-
dicates that any attack upon the statutes in their entirety will generally
be unavailing. The second aspect of the due process requirement, and
the real crux of the problem, involves the application of these statutes
45 The privileges and immunities clause (see notes 27-28 supra and accom-
panying text) and the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution have also
been grounds of attack in certain circumstances. The argument can be made
that the cost and inconvenience of defending in a distant forum may restrict com-
mercial activities and place an undue burden on interstate commerce. To invoke
the commerce clause, a defendant must prove unreasonable interference. From a
practical standpoint, it is doubtful if the threat of possible subjection to a state'sjurisdiction would impose any noticeable interference, aside from the second
question of whether the interference is "reasonable." Obviously, the commerce
clause does not preclude a state from giving needed protection to its citizens in
the course of their dealings with foreigners. See Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen,
322 U.S. 202 (1944).
40 The question of the competency of a court depends on whether the state
has conferred the requisite power on the particular court, not because the state
lacked the power.4T An example is compliance with the mechanical provisions of the relevant
service of process statute,4 8 BEsTATIEN'r OF JuDGMENTs § 4 (1942).
49 Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 898 (1900).0 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 852 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
KENTucKY LAw JouNA[
in particular fact situations. Consequently, under the more liberally
phrased statutes, avoidance of due process violations may require a
case-by-case determination, notwithstanding the fact the statute has
been declared valid on its face. 51
The due process standard announced in P,-nnoyer v. Neff52 was one
of territorial sovereignty, requiring personal service within the state.
However, Pennoyer was continually eroded by exceptions 53 until
finally a modernistic standard was formulated in International Shoe.
This new standard requires that to subject a defendant, not served
with process within the forum, to a judgment in personam, he must
"have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of a suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."54 Elaborating on this new test, the Court
stated that where the activities are continuous, systematic, and give
rise to the liabilities sued upon, there is clearly no denial of due
process. At the other end of the due process spectrum, a state cannot
obtain jurisdiction where the nonresident carries on only isolated
activities, unconnected with the cause of action. However, jurisdiction
may be had because of the nature and quality of the activity, even
though isolated, where it is connected with the cause of action and
where the defendant, by conducting such activities, has enjoyed the
benefits and protections of the forum's laws.
Under the minimum contacts test, the initial inquiry is where is
the fair, just, and reasonable place to have the trial. Unfortunately,
our federalistic system, embodying the traditional concept of territorial
sovereignty, may remain an inevitable concomitant in finding a work-
able answer to this inquiry. Secondly, the quality of the act rather
than the quantity of the activities is looked to. The significant factor
is not that so much activity must occur, but rather that the cause
of action must arise out of some activity connecting the defendant
with the forum. In those cases where the amount of activity carried
on by the nonresident is substantial, causes of action unrelated to
these activities may be entertained. 55
51 A related problem, aside from whether the statute can be constitutionally
applied, is whether, in fact, the statute applies to the defendant. This is basically
a problem of statutory construction, i.e., is the activity included within the parti-
cular language of the statute.
5295 U.S. 714 (1877).
53 See notes 1-9 supra and acompanying text.
54826 U.S. 810, 316 (1945).55 Perkins v. Benguet Consol, Mining Co., 342 .S. 437 (1952). The
actual amount of activity required to entertain causes of action unrelated to the
activities within the forum remains uncertain. Due to the absence of an alternative
forum, the significance of Perkins is questionable.
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After the decision in International Shoe, two other significant
Supreme Court cases in this area were handed down, McGee v. Inter-
national Life Insurance Company56 and Hanson v. Denckla.57 McGee
involved a suit on a contract of insurance. The only activity the
defendant conducted in the forum was mailing a reinsurance certi-
ficate into the state. This offer was accepted, but suit was later brought
on the contract. Upholding jurisdiction, the Court relied on the fact
that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection
with the forum and in which the forum had a manifest interest. Noting
the initial mailing of the reinsurance offer into the state, the Court
again focused on the nature and quality of the defendants activity
within the forum, which enabled him to enjoy the benefits and pro-
tections of the forum's laws. By so doing, the defendant was subject
to certain obligations, e.g., subjection to the state's jurisdiction as to
causes of action arising out of this activity.
In Hanson, a Pennsylvania resident executed a revocable deed of
trust with a Delaware corporation. Several years later, the Penn-
sylvania resident moved to Florida where she died. Florida's attempt
to exert jurisdiction over the trust company was denied on the theory
that no act had been done by which the defendant purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.58 Al-
though recognizing a trend towards liberalizing personal jurisdiction
requirements over nonresidents, the Court emphasized the existence of
certain territorial limitations on state power which restrict the
jurisdiction of state courts.
Despite one's first impression, Hanson can be reconciled with
contemporary due process concepts. When read in light of Inter-
national Shoe and McGee, the language59 used in Hanson should not
be construed to require the nonresidents physical presence in the
state at the time of the commission of the act giving rise to the cause
of action. A nonresident, alone or through agents, can intentionally
conduct activities which have substantial consequences within the
forum without ever physically entering the state.60 Secondly, under
56 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
57357 U.S. 235 (1958).
58 Id. at 253.
50 The specific language referred to is "the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state." Id.60 The solicitation in McGee is an example o fsuch activity without physical
entry into the state. In fact, the Court in Hanson stated that the defendant per-
formed no act in Florida which bore the same relationship to the agreement as
the solicitation in McGee.
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the Hanson rationale, an initial voluntary association with the forum
is apparently necessary. This requirement was factually present in
Hanson's predecessors, and at least implicit in the language of Inter-
national Shoe. In Hanson, however, the association with Florida was
necessitated by the existence of a previous obligation on the part of
the defendant which had no connection with Florida at the time of
its creation. Thirdly, the Hanson decision reiterates the necessity of
the cause of action arising out of activities within the forum. The
Court noted that the validity of the trust agreement was the principle
issue in the case.(1 However, the activities conducted by the defendant
within the Florida forum had no connection with this issue. Lastly, the
minimum contact required by due process must exist regardless of any
convenience factor.62 Presumably, the inconvenience to the defendant
might be so great as to amount to a denial of due process. However,
the fact that the forum is convenient for the defendant is not relevant
in establishing the requisite minimum contacts.
Despite this compatability with prior decisions, Hanson may well
represent a backward step in the search for a sound solution to
jurisdictional problems. The voluntary act which initially associates a
nonresident and a forum is similar to a test of foreseeable conse-
quences. While it was foreseeable that the settlor might have moved,
the particular state he might move to could not have been known.
On the other hand, when a manufacturer puts products into inter-
state commerce, the consequences are foreseeable in a particular
state. Such a distinction, however, is somewhat dubious. The trust
company, like the manufacturer, has entered a business where con-
sequences in other states are not only foreseeable, but probable since
personal assets are administered under the law of the deceased's domi-
cile at death. Thus it can neither be termed unfair nor an undue
burden to require subjection to suit in a state other than that of the
creation of the trust. This is especially so, as in this case, where the
trust company is merely a stakeholder and may well be regarded as
an indispensable party by the state having the duty to administer the
estate.
Moreover, the Hanson decision effectively illustrates a growing
theory in jurisdictional concepts. Although the majority of the Court
concerned itself with territorial limits of the states in obtaining per-
sonal jurisdiction, the dissent focused on the relationship of the
transaction to Florida as the administrator of the estate. Although
61 Hanson v. Denelda, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).62 Id. at 251.
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recognizing a distinction between the power of a state to apply its
own law in a case and the power of the courts of that state to
exercise jurisdiction and enter judgment,63 the dissent apparently
would go a long way in merging the two doctrines. Where a state has
sufficient contact to apply its law, it certainly seems rational to con-
clude that the state should have the authority to subject those con-
cerned with the transaction to its jurisdiction. Similarly, when a state
cannot justify application of its law, (e.g,, when a defendant is
"caught" in a state by a process server on a brief stopover and the
forum has no interest), it is likewise rational to deny the state the
power to subject those concerned to its jurisdiction. In Hanson, ap-
plication of Florida law was obviously warranted.
CONCLUSION
Succinctly stated, minimum contacts require that a nonresident
do some act or enter into some transaction within the forum. This
activity includes not only actual physical entry but also conduct
carried on outside the forum by the nonresident with the definite aim
of causing consequences within the forum which do in fact result.
The necessary connection between this activity and the particular
cause of action cannot be over-emphasized. Fulfillment of these re-
quirements helps to insure a fair, just, and reasonable place for a trial
in accordance with due process standards of fair play and substantial
justice.
To implement these new standards, the Kentucky Legislature is
urged to enact legislation which applies uniformly to nonresident
individuals, corporations, and other groups. By so doing, Kentucky
residents will be insured the reciprocal opportunity afforded persons
of many neighboring states to bring a cause of action in their home
state against an alleged wrongdoer who has had a meaningful con-
tact with the forum. The fact that Kentucky is not a state where a
large number of national and international concerns do business is no
reason to deny Kentucky residents the benefits of such legislation.
Moreover, it is hoped that such legislation will be as much for the
future as for the present.
Briefly stated, the legislation should permit the exercise of juris-
diction over nonresidents who have done an act or engaged in any
business, either while physically present within the state or with the
aim of causing consequences within the state, as to a cause of action
63 Id. at 258-59.
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arising out of such activity." Although modeled after the "single
phrase" type of long-arm statutes, the statute should be phrased
in more comprehensive terms, better articulating the activities to be
included. This can be accomplished by incorporating the relevant
legislative policy and by drawing upon the wealth of authority
interpreting similar statutes in other jurisdictions. An exhaustive at-
tempt to cover the myriad of factual situations which might arise
would, however, defeat the purpose of the legislation.
In addition, the legislation could provide that the requisite activity
be interpreted liberally in accordance with the states interest in pro-
viding a forum for the adjudication of the claims of its residents.
However, the legislation should state that the requisite act should not
be interpreted so broadly as to allow jurisdiction over a person whose
only contact with the state is his physical presence at the time of
service of process. This contact is neither sufficient from a standpoint
of fairness nor is it the activity which gives rise to the cause of action.
By such provision, three separate but interrelated factors, i.e., choice
of law, jurisdiction over the person, and fairness to the parties, can
be better coordinated in an attempt to obtain an equitable and
realistic solution to jurisdictional problems in an ever-changing
society. It should be pointed out, however, that to obtain maximum
benefit, this legislation should be accompanied by a section allowing
the court to refuse to exercise jurisdiction when it considers itself a
seriously inconvenient forum-in other words, legislation similar to
the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens.
As a result of legislative inaction, a few state courts 5 have ex-
panded their jurisdictional bases by interpreting "doing business" as
equivalent to the limits imposed by the due process clause. They
reason that in enacting doing business statutes, the legislatures in-
tended to allow the courts to expand jurisdictional bases to the fullest
extent permitted by the due process clause.66
6 4 The importance of the cause of action arising out of the activity within
the forum has been emphasized. For example, in Hanson, the activity within the
forum did not directly arise out of the basis of the cause of action. However, the
defendant's activity was such an integral and foreseeable part of the cause of
action as to provide the requisite connection. Thus, this requirement should be
liberally interpreted where the facts of the case so warrant. Where this con-
nection cannot be shown, jurisdiction may still be based on a doing business
theory.65 E.g., Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. The Superior Court in and for the County
of San Mateo, 323 P.2d 437 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1958); Benson v. Brattleboro Retreat,
164 A.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. N.H. 1960); Labonte v. American Mercury Magazine,
96 A.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. N.H. 1953).
66 The Kentucky cases reveal no discernible trend towards interpreting Ken-
tucky's doing business statute in this manner. Of the few cases decided, however,
many have obtained a liberal result. However, within the same opinion more
(Continued on next page)
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Interpretation of doing business statutes in accord with prevailing
jurisdictional concepts is a permissible method of updating our laws
on personal jurisdiction. If the Legislature refuses to enact appropriate
statutes, the courts should construe existing legislation as liberally as
possible. However, the most efficient means of accomplishing the
desired end is through comprehensive legislative action. The task of
re-ordering the law of jurisdiction over the person is essentially
legislative in nature. Without legislation, jurisdiction cannot be
acquired over nonresidents other than foreign corporations in many
situations. As previously discussed, many policy decisions are in-
volved in defining a court's jurisdiction which only the Legislature
can properly determine. Therefore, it is wiser for the Legislature to
enact its policies into law than to have the courts torture the language
in existing statutes.
In retrospect, although our state-federal system has and will con-
tinue to remain a deterrent, these modem statutes and court inter-
pretations disclose a trend towards nationwide service of process. If
the past is any indication, due process standards will expand as
society's need for extraterritorial service of process increases in ac-
cordance with the increased flow of commerce and other technological
advances. At present, federal legislation allows nationwide service
of process in interpleader actions67 before district courts.68 However,
absent the probability in the near future of any multi-state compact or
federal enabling legislation based on a theory of inter-state transfer
of venue, state legislatures should expand jurisdictional bases and
supplement them by the use of forum non conveniens in appropriate
cases.
Charles R. Simons
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
liberal pronouncements have been intermingled with the traditional doing
business language. See WSAZ, Inc. v. Gearhart, 150 F. Supp. 98 (E. D. Ky.
1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1958).67 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1964). In addition, the proposed revision of Title 28 by
the American Law Institute provides for the issuance of process for all parties
necessary for a just adjudication which process may run anywhere within the
territorial limits of the United States. ALl, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts, Part I, Official Draft § 2344 (1965).
6828 U.S.C. § 1404 (1964), provides for a transfer of venue in the district
court system.
